The procurement of UK public services has seen considerable changes during the final twenty years of the millennium. Successive governments have legislated to impose firstly compulsion to compete on price, followed by a duty to achieve Best Value. Property and construction professional consultants were under an obligation to their professional bodies not to compete on price less than twenty years ago. The first part of this paper chronicles the main stages in this period of great change.
Introduction
When Leonidas' 300 This rather jaundiced view of competitive fee tendering is provided by a UK property professional (Whitehead, 1999 ) who appears to have been on the wrong end of the value for money calculation recently! Yet the majority of property and construction professional services carried out by the private sector for the UK public sector are now let on a fee tendered basis. Following the abolition of professional institution mandatory fee scales for such work less than twenty years ago, there has been unrelenting pressure from successive UK governments for competition to prevail. This paper charts this development and then attempts to answer the question implied by the final sentence of Whitehead's statement -has fee tendering led to lower standards of service quality in the provision of public sector professional services in the property and construction field?
The Background to Competition
The current economic climate in which construction professionals operate is highly competitive with commissions of any size rarely being awarded without some form of fee tendering exercise. Yet it is only 17 years since the RICS amended Bye-law 24 In February 1994 proposals for the implementation of CCT for professional construction-related and property services were announced (DOE, 1994) . The initial timetable for metropolitan districts and
London boroughs was to implement CCT for 35% of these services on 1 October 1995 rising to 65% from 1 April 1996. Shire Counties and districts subject to possible unitary authority re-organisation were exempt from these requirements until after the re-organisation review has been completed. The latest government guidance on CCT for professional services required only 55% of an authority's construction and property services to be exposed to competition (DETR, 1997).
The UK stood alone in Europe as the only country to introduce compulsion to tender (Pottinger, 1995, p25) (DETR, 1998, p5) . Other criticisms included the fact that all too often the process of competition became an end in itself (DETR, 1998, p6) and in many cases the lack of any interest in an external competition (DETR, 1998, p20 (RICS, 1997)
The principal concern in the public sector was over the possible loss of jobs and the extensive reorganisation necessary to separate client and supply functions.
The duty of Best Value was enacted in the Local Government Act 1999 and the main provisions of the legislation are:
• All CCT legislation was repealed on 2 January 2000.
• Authorities to publish Best Value Performance Plans by 31 March 2000 and external auditors to report on them by 30 June 2000. These plans to set out a programme of Best Value Reviews, including an assessment of previous performance in 1999-2000 and set measurable targets for the years ahead.
• The Duty of Best Value was imposed from 1 April 2000 when the process of 5 year review cycles commenced. These were supported by an external audit and inspection regime.
• The Secretary of State has powers to intervene where an authority is failing to provide best value. (DETR, 1999a) The reviews are central to Best Value and must include demanding performance targets to ensure continuous improvement. The government suggests that the reviews should incorporate the "4Cs" :
• challenge why and how the service is being provided;
• secure comparison with the performance of others across a range of relevant indicators, taking into account the views of both service users and potential suppliers;
• consult local taxpayers, service users, partners and the wider business community in the setting of new performance targets;
• consider fair competition as a means of securing efficient and effective services.
(DETR, 1999b)
Thus it will be seen that the Best Value concept has its origins in the fundamental late Twentieth Century management concepts of competition, benchmarking and continuous improvement. The big difference between Best value and CCT is that in the new regime service quality is given as much emphasis as the cost of the work.
The Fee Tendering Process
Several guides to good practice for fee tendering have been produced (e.g. CIC, 1992 and CIRIA, 1994 ). An analysis of these documents suggests that each of the following factors is critical to achieving a successful outcome :
• adequate specification of the service required at the time of going out to tender;
• careful pre-selection of tenderers;
• adequate weighting to ability given in the final selection process.
Of particular relevance to this final point are the findings of the Construction Industry Board (CIB) who were tasked "..... to choose and then endorse a specific quality and price assessment mechanism for the engagement of professional consultants", which was part of Recommendation 13.5 of the Latham Report (Latham, 1994, p47) .
Working Group 4's Report, "Selecting Consultants for the Team : Balancing Quality and Price", (CIB, 1996) contains detailed guidance for the adoption of such a mechanism.
Service Quality and Competition
The Whitehead (1999) The MMC concluded that such cases would be likely to be exceptional. However, many professional services are high in credence qualities (Zeithaml, 1981, pp 186-190) . That is, clients find them difficult to assess because they do not possess the skills to do so. This suggests that the scenario described in the 1970 report may be more common than the MMC anticipated.
In • 73% give less consideration to design alternatives;
• 31% give less consideration to checking and reviewing designs;
• 40% consider that the risks of design errors occurring are higher;
• 74% admit that they are producing simpler designs to minimise the commitment of resources to a task;
• 84% assess the number of claims for additional fees to be higher;
• 69% see less trust between client and consulting engineer;
• 94% bid low to maintain the cash flow or (on occasion) to test the market;
• 35% bid low with the intention of doing less than in the enquiry;
• 61% bid low with the intention of making up fees with claims for variations.
(Latham, 1994, pp 44-45).
Latham also referred to a report by the Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland which contains the following quotation from one firm : 
Research Hypotheses
The evidence provided above came almost exclusively from the professions but of course it is public sector clients' perceptions which are important here. With this fact in mind the following hypotheses were stated as the basis for the research reported in this paper: 
Measuring Service Quality
Testing these hypotheses involved measuring public sector clients' perceptions of service quality but is this as easy as it might at first seem? Given that "Quality is an elusive concept" (Gummesson, 1981, p111) how does one attempt to measure it?
A group of service marketing researchers in the United States have developed a generic service quality assessment scale that has been used extensively in industry and academe in recent years. Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry's (1988 and 1991) twenty-two item scale is known as SERVQUAL and measures quality across the five dimensions that they discovered (see Table 1 ). The SERVQUAL development work has been replicated by many researchers and several have recommended that the scale be adapted to suit each particular service setting. The SURVEYQUAL scale which has been used to test this study's hypotheses was developed by carrying out a comparison of the SERVQUAL study and three other studies, which were :-
• a study of architectural service quality (Cravens, Dielman and Kent, 1985) ,
• RESERV -a scale for assessing US real estate brokers (Nelson and Nelson, 1995),
• a study of UK building surveying service quality ( Hoxley, 1994) .
The resulting scale has 25 items upon which clients were requested to rate an anonymous consultant using a balanced Likert 7 point attitude scale. Three items which were included originally were dropped following purification of the scale because they were found to have insufficient correlation with other scale items and therefore with "service quality". Two items were concerned with the consultant's office -with its location and its appearance and the other with the size of the firm.
The 25 scale items are shown in Table 2 below. 
Data Collection
The scale was sent to 400 public sector client organisations located throughout the UK and 189 clients responded (47%) by anonymously assessing consultants.
Figures 1 and 2 below indicate the types of clients who responded and the professions of the consultants assessed. It will be seen that 70% of the clients were local authorities and that nearly 60% of the professionals were Chartered Surveyors (and over half of these were Quantity Surveyors). 
Results
In addition to the assessment of the consultant, clients also answered questions that were associated with the five hypotheses. Thus they indicated the method by which the consultant was appointed (fee tendering, negotiation, direct appointment, etc), and also answered questions relevant to the other hypotheses. In order to test each hypothesis the service quality score, using the SURVEYQUAL scale, was computed for each case. Means of this score (the dependent variable) were then computed and tabulated for each value of the independent variable associated with each hypothesis. Finally a one-way analysis of variance was computed to test the null hypothesis that there are no differences between these means.
The mean scores for the three main methods of appointment are indicated in Figure   3 below. Nearly 60% of the consultants assessed were appointed by competitive fee tendering. The main hypothesis was however not supported by the data collected, in that although a lower score was recorded for those consultants appointed by competitive fee tendering, this result was not statistically significant (p=0.34).
Similarly the hypotheses that service quality is lower when the fee bid is more competitive and higher when the service has been well specified and when adequate weighting has been given to ability in the final selection process, have not been supported by the data. However the hypothesis that service quality is higher when care has been taken with the pre-selection of tenderers is supported by the analysis of the data (p=0.04).
Discussion
The main result of this study has provided reassuring evidence to the institutions representing construction and property professions that their members have not allowed their standards to slip in the face of increased competition. Similarly public sector clients can take comfort from the result that government imposed competition has not resulted in a substandard service. The data collection phase of this research took place when CCT was in operation. As discussed previously the Best Value regime has been introduced in order that both quality and cost are considered when public services are provided. This study suggests that high levels of service quality were already being delivered during the CCT era. There is much evidence that fee levels have fallen to a significant extent since the introduction of competition. If service quality has not declined, this can only mean that profitability has fallen and/or that consultants have become more efficient. Certainly professional firms are much leaner than they were 15 years ago. The introduction of IT has contributed to a reduction in the number of clerical and technical staff employed by professional organisations during that time. Although a small proportion of professional firms have not survived in this highly competitive market, those that have survived, have done so by increasing their efficiency and/or accepting reduced profit levels.
Conclusion
Fee levels have fallen to a significant extent since the abolition of mandatory fee scales some seventeen years ago. The data collected as part of this study suggest that fee tendering is now the principal route for the appointment of construction professionals for public sector work in the UK. However the main result of this study is that fee tendering has not led to a decline in clients' perceptions of service quality.
Another finding is that public sector clients can positively influence the likely level of service received from their consultant by taking care with the pre-selection of tenderers. Thus the public sector clients surveyed as part of this study do not share Whitehead's (1999) view that those consultants successful in the value for money calculation do not understand the service they are providing.
